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FURTHER ON GOOD AND ITS STRUCTURE

THE purpose of the present paper is to add a few reflections to the discussion on the definability of "good," renewed in a recent article in this JOURNAL.[1] Like the writer of the article, Mr. Williams, I believe that this question presents a living issue for philosophic thought, and the final answer will be that good is definable. On the other hand he grants too much to the opposing view in shifting the discussion to the definability of yellow and assuming the resemblance of good and yellow as qualities.

For the opposing view one is generally referred to Professor Moore's *Principia Ethica*, where it is argued that good is a simple unanalyzable quality, like yellow, and can therefore be recognized and pointed out, but not defined. It is conceded, however, that it may be possible to give an account of the indispensable conditions of the presence of the quality; but to identify the quality with its conditions is to commit the Naturalistic Fallacy. Mr. Williams' reply amounts to this, "There is no Naturalistic Fallacy, or, as far as it really matters, the quality (e.g., yellow) is definable by the account of its conditions. The same method may be used in defining good." Though he inclines to it, he does not go the full length of *identifying* yellow with its physical or physiological correlates; but he argues that the "quale" is only the "raw feel," the "sensuous and unique whole aspect."

It is important to note that definition in this sense is the only possible kind in dealing with yellow. The other types (following Mr. Johnson) may be disputed here with some justification. They are not strictly definitions which set out the "what" of a given "that." Ostensive definition only points out the "that." Bi-verbal definition may be valid in other cases (I believe it is in the case of good), but in dealing with yellow we are reduced to giving translations or synonyms. Neither is the synthetic definition of yellow (e.g., by its position in the colour-pyramid) real definition since it only tells us where to look for the "that," and if it be carried further, it resolves itself into an account of the conditions of the presence of the quality. Definition *per genus et differentiam* rarely works in the case of adjectives. The only sense in which yellow can be defined, if it can, is by the account of the indispensable conditions of its appearance.

[1] "The Definition of Yellow and of Good" by Donald Cary Williams, Vol. XXVII, pp. 515–527 (Sept. 11, 1930).

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This commits the Naturalistic Fallacy, and the dispute is at bottom whether there is such a Fallacy, and if there is, whether it is negligible.

With the answer I am not here concerned. It seems probable that no definite solution can be arrived at, since there is involved the whole problem of mind and body and of primary and secondary qualities. But I am concerned that the answer to the question of the definability of good should not depend on, and await, the solution of these other problems. That it does is implied by the admission that good is a quality like yellow. It carries the whole argument over to another field—the validity of definition involving the Naturalistic Fallacy—where the two opposite positions can be maintained with almost equal claims. In what follows, therefore, it will be argued that whereas yellow can not possibly be defined without committing the Naturalistic Fallacy, (whether this is justifiable or not does not concern us), good can, and therein would lie the real refutation of such a position as that taken up in the *Principia Ethica*. Mr. Williams himself hints at this very great difference when he says, "It is quite likely that the quality good may prove to be the whole-*quale* of a structure whose significant elements are immediately discernible in experience, so that resort to inexperiencible constituents or correlates will be unnecessary for its definition and analysis. In this sense only are experientially complex qualities more readily analyzable than experientally simple qualities" (p. 523).

Another type of argument for the simplicity and indefinability of the concept of value is the well-known dogma, "Fact is fact and nothing but fact. How then can 'ought' be derived from 'is,' or 'good' from any other qualities or descriptive elements?" In dealing with good, it takes up the position we have already examined. But "oughtness" or "obligation," despite its claimed simplicity, can scarcely be a quality of a situation. The obligation is encumbent on the person in question; its ground lies in the character of the situation. This suggests that the supposed simplicity of a concept such as obligation may be a type of unity not necessarily resulting in indefinability. The concept may be employed to summarize a situation or indicate the unified structure (itself composite) of the situation. Many concepts have this character and therein they differ greatly from those under which we comprehend particular objects or particular activities (e.g., table, house, man, running, speaking). The difference is that situations, not things, are thus comprehended.

William James thought it was a sort of tautology, on being asked why it was dark, if one answered, "because it is night." In a sense he was right; night is a term we use to summarize the various occasions on which darkness prevails. But in a deeper sense he was

wrong. It was not a duplication of entities when the name "night" was given to the whole wider situation which was felt to be responsible for the single fact of darkness. As knowledge advanced night came to mean the period of darkness during which that portion of the earth is turned away from the sun. But even before this was known, the statement, "It is dark, because it is night," signified at least the recognition that the fact of darkness was not a self-dependent, isolated fact, but rested on a wider basis of which it was a manifestation. If now someone were to say, "Night is an indefinable concept; you have not analyzed it by giving the indispensable conditions of its existence," and were at the same time to maintain that it was not equivalent to darkness, he would be multiplying entities. By night we do *mean* "the period during which, that part of the earth being turned away from the sun, there is darkness." Night is therefore a concept used to summarize a situation, and it was always so used as long as it was distinguished from darkness. The knowledge of this situation has increased; the concept itself, though clarified, has not extended its scope. It remains to note that it does not describe the whole situation in all its particulars. It is not concerned with particular time, duration, or place. It summarizes the common structure in such situations, which makes them situations of a certain kind. Such a structure has a unity, but not an indefinable simplicity. To call "night" indefinable in other terms than itself, no one would venture except on the basis of the most vicious abstraction.

For the sake of brevity I shall call such a concept which describes the common structure of various situations a *synoptic concept.*

Let us consider a second example: "This man lifts great weights because of his strength." If strength is a mere summary of the various acts of a certain kind, which we have seen him perform, then the statement is a tautology. Certainly it means something more; it gives some idea of the structure of his body, of his muscles, the grounds within him of the acts he performs. If we identified strength with muscularity, we would be committing the Naturalistic Fallacy. But we do not. The statement, "he possesses strength" (or "he is strong") does not mean, "He has huge muscles, etc." It is, however, fully explained by saying, "He has huge muscles, etc., which are the grounds of actions of a certain kind." Strength is a synoptic concept, describing the common structure in various events. The man does not possess strength in addition to his muscles, nor as a quality added to his bodily frame. He is strong because he has a frame (or mentality) satisfying certain conditions which may be expressed in other terms than strength.[2] The particular situations in which these conditions are apprehended as the condi-

[2] The ground may not always be known, e.g., "He is cunning."

tions of actions of a certain type, have a common structure which is expressed in the proposition, "He is strong," and synoptically in the concept of "strength" or "strong."

It might be said that the same account could be given of yellow as of strong. If we took the statement "This is yellow," to mean "waves of a certain kind originating from the object impinge upon my retina," we would be committing the Naturalistic Fallacy. On the other hand, if we took it to mean, "Waves of a certain kind originating from the object impinge upon my retina with the result that I have a certain sensation," we would be doing what corresponds to begging the question, since "having a certain sensation," is exactly what would be meant by "seeing yellow." It was not the same in defining strength. There, "actions of a certain kind" were quite definite in that they could be expressed in other terms than "strong," e.g., lifting heavy weights. Yellow, therefore, can only be defined by committing the Naturalistic Fallacy; otherwise there is at most a precise correlation of physical, physiological, and psychical facts. On the other hand, a synoptic concept, such as "strong," is capable of definition by an account of the structure common to the various situations in which it is found. It may be expressed generally in the proposition "x is strong," or in the conception of "x's strength." The meaning of these, when we do not substitute anything definite for x, gives us the bare structure—an object containing grounds for acts of a definite character (i.e., that common to such acts as lifting great weights, or supporting them, since one might speak of the strength of a table.)

A still better illustration (for it covers a wider field) is the concept of power. The structure of situations giving rise to the statement of power may be expressed in the proposition "x can do X," where x is any thing and X any activity. The structure may therefore be described as "x contains the ground of an activity X, which results, given certain attendant circumstances." A very good example of the synoptic nature of the concept of power is afforded by such a proposition as "I like power," which can only mean when expanded, "I like that the ground of acts of a certain character (i.e., those involving subjection of persons or things) should lie within me, and, given certain conditions (i.e., the exercise of my will) those acts should result."

It is now clear that synoptic concepts can not be explained properly when held in abstraction. They describe situations, or rather, the common structure in situations, and explanation or definition can result only from a consideration of the situations and an expansion of a general or indefinite proposition employing the concept. That many adjectives are really synoptic concepts can be seen from the

method in which some dictionaries often explain them as "the quality of being or doing something or other," where that something or other reveals the structure represented by the concept.

If "goodness" (and good) is, like power or strength, a synoptic concept, it should be possible to describe in other terms the common structure it represents and expand a general proposition employing the conception. What, then, is the structure common to situations in which the judgment of value is made? Or, (which amounts to the same thing) what is the meaning of "*x* is good."? Is it "*x* possesses a certain indefinable quality," or "*x* is such that in given circumstances it acts in a certain way"? No reason can be given for predicating yellowness of a subject, other than perception of the quality. But if one be asked why he calls anything good, he will at once try to give reasons. That man is good because he is courageous, truthful, etc. His goodness is not something he possesses in addition to his courage and truth-telling. There is a certain parallel to this opposition in Berkeley's *Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision*, where he argues that explanation of what is perceptible can only be in terms of something else that is perceptible, and not of conditions unperceived.

The evidence points towards the conclusion that good is a synoptic concept rather than an indefinable quality. There remains the very difficult task of outlining, however tentatively, the structure it represents which is common to situations from which the judgment of goodness arises. This structure may be best detected in considering the origin of conception. Aristotle got to the root of it in very few words, when he said (*De Anima*-434 a 8–10) speaking of the power which men have of representing images for deliberation (*βουλευτικὴ φαντασία*): *καὶ ἀνάγκη ἑνὶ μετρεῖν· τὸ μεῖζον γὰρ διώκει. ὥστε δύναται ἓν ἐκ πλειόνων φαντασμάτων ποιεῖν.* ("It must be measured by one standard; for it is the greater which the reasoning animal pursues. Thus it is able to form one conception out of several images.")

The concept is a concept of several particulars; it is not an abstraction or universalization of one or a few essential qualities or properties of the particulars. It is each of the particulars as it is for thought; it is not in any sense a fixed or static form to which the particulars add details. The concept is thus the standard of the particulars; with respect to it, not as an external, but as an immanent standard, they may be ordered in a series. This is what I think Aristole refers to in *τὸ μειζον*. In this sense it might be said that man is the measure of men from scarcely a man to a great man. The same is true of any other concept. (The ordering of this series is often practically impossible due to the complexity of the concept, except for mere approximation by the choice of relatively

arbitrary marks, as in art criticism; theoretically the problem is simply that of the clarification of the concept. The point is that such clarification does involve a declaration of principles on which the series would be ordered.)

In this "more or less"[3] involved in the very nature of a concept, we find the structure of the concept of goodness. In respect to any concept, its "more or less" is its "better or worse." The comparative idea is thus prior to the positive, which is a line marked as a starting-point by any age, relative to its achievements. In the situation indicated by the judgment of goodness there is implied an activity and a subject of the activity and a standard set by the concept of the activity in terms of its own. The variation in men's and peoples' discernment of these terms constitutes the history of dissension about values. This will be of significance when we come to consider how far a science of morality is possible. From what has been said, it follows that one is much more likely to learn about the goodness of man from a study of man's nature, than from a study of goodness.

A subject of the activity, the activity, and a standard set by the concept of the activity in terms of its own—these constitute the structure of the concept of goodness. They are specified or implied in every judgment of goodness. "x is good" therefore means, "x has a greater or less capacity (i.e., a more or less developed capacity) for the activity X." What is a more or less developed capacity depends on the standard which the concept of the activity implies, and can be stated (the more so as knowledge advances) in terms of its own. Where the activity is simple, this account is simple; where the activity is complex (e.g., ruling, the activity of friendship, etc.) there are often distinguished constitutive activities whose harmonious exercise makes up the chief one. And most complex of all is living, the activity of the subject man. It may seem to some extremely artificial to embrace the many-sided life of men in one activity. This, however, is the implication of the judgments we make about individual men, that they are good or evil. A man is good, not by the possession of some indefinable quality, but by possessing the ground of activity of some kind; and the particular activity is good not in virtue of some indefinable quality, but in virtue either of its position in the series ordered by the concept of that activity, or of the part it plays in some wider activity which it partially constitutes.

The latter case brings us to the conception of "good for." For example, in the proposition, "Walking is good," the implication is "good for man," and the subject and activity in the situation with

[3] Of degree, not necessarily quantity; utilitarianism is an example of an attempt to reduce it entirely to the quantitative.

reference to which "good" is used, are "man" and "living" (not "walking"). The proposition means ultimately, "Walking aids the development and exercise of man's capacity for living." Or, if it is not carried so far, it may mean merely, "Walking is good for the health," which, when expanded in terms of the structure, becomes, "Walking aids the development and exercise of man's capacity for physical life (or living)."

It is obvious that "good for" and "a good to," which on some views are dismissed from a discussion of goodness as merely synonyms for "useful," involve the same conceptual structure as "good." The employment of the same word may perhaps be considered some evidence in favor of the above analysis. Fresh difficulties arise in a detailed consideration of propositions containing "right" and "obligation," in relation to those containing "good." To follow this up would narrow the field; goodness must be explained in all its contexts, not only in the so-called moral judgments, and there seems to me to be a justifiable initial prejudice in favor of a view which would relate the so-called moral and non-moral uses of "good" as against a view which refuses to acknowledge any community in the two concepts. A thorough examination of the problem would require a new *Principia Ethica.* For the present it is sufficient to point out that it is a corollary of the position outlined above that moral and non-moral good do not differ in kind, but only in the greater complexity of the activity implied by the former.

Further difficulties would follow from the consideration of propositions of so-called intrinsic or absolute goodness, e.g., "It is good to be a man," or "God is good." Each requires detailed treatment. We may but suggest that a consideration of context will show the first to be a judgment not about an absolute quality of a man, but (if it has any meaning, and is not an ejaculation of delight) about man's place in the animal world. The second is a judgment, not of an indefinable quality in God, but rather of God as the ground for a world of a particular kind, most likely a rational world. This is very well illustrated in Plato's arguments on the goodness of God in book two of the *Republic.*

Though the difficulties may be great enough to compel serious modification in our outline of the conceptual structure of good, two points must be stressed as demonstrated: first, whatever prove to be the correct outline, it will be an interpretation in terms of activity, not of quality; secondly, the method employed to correct and improve the outline will remain the same, viz., the search for a conceptual structure on the assumption that good is a synoptic concept. This is also the method by which the investigation should be pushed into the field of morals proper, and the meaning of "right" and "obligation" determined.

It would be well to add a few words on the "science of morality" to which many look forward with fond hopes. Mr. Williams, for example, says, "The science of color can teach us how to make things yellow (for instance). The science of morality will make a solid and admirable contribution when it can teach us how to make things good" (pp. 522–523). On the basis of the structure outlined above, there can be, strictly speaking, no special science of morality; it may be the sum of all the sciences on their practical side. One would have thought that Plato's arguments are enough to end such hopes. To become a good doctor, one studies medicine, not morality; to make good shoes one studies shoe-making, not goodness. To learn how to make a child good, it is true, one might study the "science of morality" and then apply it. But this science would consist either of a body of rules dealing with the nature of men and children and their tendencies (in which case it would not be a science of morality), or of a few general rules, such as to preserve the mean in everything. Aristotle's attempt to found such a "science of morality" and his failure at precision in it, is instructive. There can be no science of the good because it has no specific subject-matter. That is in part what Plato meant by the unique position he assigned to the form of the good. We have seen its generality to lie in its intimate association with the very act of conception.

The only possible meaning, therefore, for the "science of morality" is the "study of man," and in this sense Aristotle thought it was politics. Our age would include politics, economics, sociology, psychology, and especially biology—and perhaps all the other sciences as well, in as far as they have any influence on practical life.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Pastures of Wonder. The Realm of Mathematics and the Realm of Science. CASSIUS JACKSON KEYSER. New York: Columbia University Press. 1929. xii + 208 pp.

When one thinks about the formal analysis of thought one wonders how the world keeps going. For, under the influence of the analysis, there is a tendency to visualize the edifice of reason as a kind of madhouse in which half the people rush about earnestly assuring one another if only you make the assumption that $A = B$, you may prove to a dead certainty that $A = B$, while the other half is engaged in reasoning that if you observe a piece of wood you may conclude, with many reservations and for all practical purposes, that you observe a piece of wood. One is almost driven to think that

the genuine triumphs of thought must have consisted in a kind of defiance of logic, in some illegitimate loyalty to unwarranted deductions, in some *affaire de coeur* with empirical generalizations based on really insufficient evidence. It is hard to say whether logic is mad or the world is mad, but certainly the same kind of sanity is not easily found in both.

It is not Professor Keyser's book itself which touches off the foregoing sentiments so much as a consideration of those fields into which the subject-matter of the book, upon analysis, leads. *Pastures of Wonder* is a remarkably clear and concise treatment of those matters with which it is explicitly concerned.

It is concerned with "The Realm of Mathematics" and "The Realm of Science" and the purpose is to "report" a certain definition of mathematics and to "propose" a certain definition of science. These definitions are rendered in terms of the kind of proposition which either type of thought is interested in establishing.

Mathematics is defined as that reasoning which is "hypothetico-deductive" in character—its aim is to establish hypothetical propositions. An hypothetical proposition is not merely one which has the "if—then" form, because wholly empirical propositions devoi any deductive relation may be put in that form: "If you pray for me, then I will pray for you." A genuinely hypothetical proposition must be able to take the form, p implies q, in which q has not merely the status of an empirical consequence of p, but is logically deducible from it. Why? Otherwise, the concept of hypothetical proposition, and its complement, categorical proposition, would not serve to distinguish the two greatly different realms of truth—the truth of a correct deduction and the truth of a correct observation. These two senses of the word "truth" have such an utterly different significance that our distinction as between propositions should be made to correspond to them.

A mathematical proposition is, therefore, a proposition which is true or false in the deductive sense, and a scientific proposition should be recognized as one that is true or false in the empirical sense.

A number of important conclusions with regard to the nature of mathematical thinking follow from this position. It is seen that a mathematical proposition, as such, always asserts the relation of implication (which is described as logical deducibility, but is described no further) between one proposition or a certain set of propositions and another proposition. The bare statement: "The square on the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle is equal to the sum of the squares on the other two sides" is not a mathematical proposition and is not mathematically true. What is mathematical is the proposition that that proposition may be deduced from other propo-

sitions, called axioms and postulates in Euclid's geometry. What is mathematically true is not the concluding proposition, but that the deduction of the latter from the former is correct. Mathematics is concerned only whether p does imply q. It is not concerned, as mathematics, with whether p is true or q is true.

This position, as far as it goes, seems perfectly sound. Any single proposition in what has been traditionally called mathematics, asserted in isolation, has no kind of truth whatever. It would certainly have no empirical truth because of the way mathematical entities, with which such a proposition deals, are defined. They are defined precisely in that way which will place them beyond reach of the empirical. Empirically they have no status. In geometry, for instance, the conclusions concern figures made up of lines of length and no width. It is impossible to observe or experiment upon these figures, and the same is true of the subject-matter of all branches of mathematics. One may come to conclusions about such entities, but not to empirical conclusions. Moreover, a "theorem" in traditional mathematics, such as the one about the square on the hypotenuse, is not true until proved true. The only way in which it can be proved true is to deduce it from other propositions—in other words, to show that a implies b. Whether a is or is not an empirical proposition makes no difference. Whether a is or is not empirically true makes no difference.

Pursuing our conclusions further, we see that mathematics is not limited to considerations of numbers, lines, planes and the like, nor is it limited to any one type of subject-matter. It is apparent that correct deductions may be made as between propositions of any content whatever or of no content whatever beyond meaningless symbols. One may say, taking for granted such intervening steps as are logically necessary:

1. That a straight line is the shortest distance between two points implies that the sum of two sides of a triangle is greater than the third side.

2. That all flubjubs are dingbats implies that some dingbats are flubjubs.

3. That John has a sister Mary implies that Mary has a brother John.

4. That a cow is an elephant and an elephant is a bird implies that a cow is a bird.

As stated, 1, 2, 3, and 4 are mathematical propositions the truth of which no one can doubt because they all assert correct implication. The two latter propositions happen to involve empirical content. In 3 the stated content seems to be true empirically. It is to be supposed that there are plenty of Johns who have sisters Mary, who

in turn have brothers John. In 4 the empirical content is false. We know that cows are neither elephants nor birds. 2 has no content meaningful in the empirical sense because in that sense flubjubs and dingbats are nothing. 1 has terms suggestive of empirical content, but in reality they are emptied of such by the Euclidean definitions of line and triangle. In short, 1, 2, 3, and 4 are all true in the hypothetico-deductive sense, although as among the constituent propositions between which each asserts implication, some are empirical and others are not, and some of those which are empirical are true while others are false. The mathematics in every case lies in the deduction.

If all the four propositions cited are mathematical, what is the relation between what we are used to calling mathematics, an instance of which is proposition 1 and the kind of thinking exemplified in 2, 3, and 4, which seems to have nothing to do with mathematics. Both, says Professor Keyser, are applications of mathematical thinking. The distinction we should make is not between "pure" mathematics in the traditional sense and applied mathematics, but between "sheer" mathematics and mathematical applications. Sheer mathematics is a consideration of the logical relations themselves, form without content, asserted in terms or symbols such as p and q which denote nothing in particular. Mathematical applications are the same forms into which some empirical content has been introduced, such as brother, sister, cow, bird, or terms suggestive of actual content, such as line, point, triangle.

Thus mathematics is a consideration of forms involving no particular kind of subject-matter and applicable to any just because mathematical truth never means to say that some isolated proposition is correct, but that a certain proposition may be deduced from another or a group of others. Such truth depends wholly on the form of propositions or the form which is taken by the relation between propositions, and not at all on their content. In reality, mathematics has to do, not alone with the world of actuality, but with that larger world of which actuality is a part—the world of possibility.

The treatment of "The Realm of Science" complements this analysis. Whereas mathematics deals in a certain way with the world of possibility, science limits itself, in a different sort of dealing, to the world of actuality. Science is concerned with establishing categorical propositions—that a is so or that b is so. Scientific method becomes any means, process, or instrumentality by which such categorical propositions are established. Professor Keyser notes that one such means, continually helpful, but never conclusive, is logical deduction itself, as when a scientist says, or gets a mathe-

matician to say—if this proposition is true, certain observable consequences must follow. If he observes all the deduced consequences to follow, his hypothesis is substantiated by so much. In this and in other ways mathematics constantly enters into science, by suggesting where science might look for something. But deducing q from p and looking for q are profoundly different operations. It is therefore proposed to define science as a body of categorical propositions, or in the sense of an enterprise, as an attempt to establish categorical propositions.

It is beyond doubt, as Professor Keyser points out, that science stands badly in need of a clear and explicit definition. The variety of contradictory senses in which the term is seriously used, often to pronounce judgment on the most ultimate issues, is a disgrace to the intellectual world and a golden opportunity for clever advertisers, propagandists, what not. When one considers the conceptions of science entertained by the public at large, and the terrible power of those conceptions, deciding matters ranging from a choice of toothpaste to the status of almighty God, together with the black confusion and rank muddle of them, one is actually filled with a despairing and melting sense of pity that such things should be.

In relation to the main theme of this very small book—it numbers two hundred pages of large type and generous spacing—various matters are touched upon briefly and pointedly: the rôle of definition, the place of undefined terms, the concept of a logically perfect language, and the like. The whole thing is done in a lively and humane manner, with a minimum of technicality and very clearly. In fact, so clear is the book in what it does treat that it had the effect of raising in my mind the question whether a book may not be too clear, as tending to make unnecessary that mental activity on the part of the reader which is a condition of comprehension. But this is too deep a matter for the present review.

Every now and again the author carries forward his treatment by means of a dialogue between himself and the reader, between himself and a scientist or some such character as a means of ironing out difficult points. The book has a deal of sharpened individuality about it which holds interest. I have assigned it in two of my courses in general philosophy as, all things considered, the most pointed introduction to an analytic consideration of physical science and mathematics. The results seemed to me to be good.

Difficulties arise not so much from within the actual limits of the book as from matters into which it leads, but does not discuss. One instance is the division of all possible propositions into two types—the hypothetical and the categorical. Bluntly, does this not leave a moral proposition without any status whatever? I mean a state-

ment of the form, men should not steal. Such a statement would seem to fulfill the conditions necessary to make it a proposition without fitting naturally into either one of the all-inclusive types.

Whether or not the preceding point is minor, the following is certainly major. Professor Keyser's discussion at almost every point turns upon the distinction between empirical truth and mathematical truth, the former limiting itself to the actual, the latter unlimited except by the possible. It is necessary to make and see this distinction, Professor Keyser maintains, because a scientific or categorical proposition can be verified only by means of observation and experiment, while a mathematical proposition simply asserts logical deducibility, and has nothing whatever to do with empirical verification.

But how is a hypothetico-deductive proposition verified? How do we know, when we assert a relation of implication, that the assertion is a correct one? Consider the following proposition in "sheer" mathematics: That (1) all a's are b's, and that (2) all b's are c's imply that (3) all a's are c's. Let us take Professor Keyser's advice, examine the familiar as if it were strange, and ask ourselves what warrant we have for saying it is true that (1) and (2) imply (3). Suppose someone said that the implication or deduction was a false one or that he doubted it. It would do no good to supply more primitive logical principles, as that a can not be both b and not b, because such principles only supply more propositions from which to make the deduction, and it is deducibility itself which is under discussion.

The question is, what is our warrant for considering any deduction, however primitive, to be correct, to have any truth, not to say any meaning, status, relevancy. To verify an empirical proposition we must at least go outside the proposition itself. When I assert, it is true that I have written the letter a, the proposition may be verified by observation of what I have written. Now one may suggest with point that the verification of a hypothetico-deductive proposition is ultimately a matter of the same kind of evidence. We have our warrant for saying it is true that all a's are c's if all a's are b's and all b's are c's from our continuous and impressive experience of the fact, and it is difficult to see that we have it from any other quarter. It is a condition of the world (of actuality) that when an a is a b and a b is a c, the a is a c. For instance, when I hold in my hand a pencil, and the pencil is composed of wood and graphite, then I hold in my hand something composed of wood and graphite. That is the kind of world we live in. When a person with whom you are talking has a name, and his name is Humperdinck, then it always happens that you are talking with Humperdinck. Suppose this was

not true of the actual world. Suppose at a certain instant in which you held a pencil, that the pencil was composed of wood and graphite, and during the same instant you found you were not holding something composed of wood and graphite—I would lay a wager that every logician in that kind of world would declare it false that the proposition *a* is *c* follows by implication from the propositions *a* is *b* and *b* is *c*.

A logician of our own world may retort that it is possible to show correct deduction as between propositions themselves patently false in the empirical sense, as in the instance: If a cow is an elephant, and an elephant is a bird, then a cow is a bird. Again, why does the logician feel sure that this constitutes correct reasoning? Is it not because it always occurs in his experience that when the cow in the pasture is the quadruped in the pasture, and the quadruped in the pasture is grazing, the cow in the pasture is grazing. This is the sort of thing that experience always affirms and never denies. Is it not because of our continuous functioning in such situations that we feel no hesitation in affirming that *if* a cow *were* an elephant, and an elephant *were* a bird, then a cow *would be* a bird. If our experience denied such principles and did not affirm them, our logic would probably be framed accordingly. If anyone doubts this, let him ask himself why he considers it more true to deduce *a* is *c* from the propositions *a* is *b* and *b* is *c*, than to deduce from them, *a* is not *c*. The same considerations would naturally apply to every form of deduction or implication.

To make this point is not to deny that there are distinctions between mathematical thinking and empirical thinking. But if the point is sound it reveals a common ground between them, basic in nature, of the presence of which no intimation can be gained from Professor Keyser's discussion. Moreover, to carry the point one step further, we would have to modify considerably the relation between the conceptions of actuality and possibility as they are developed in the book. The patterns of possibility would be seen, in every instance, as drawn from actuality, and instead of the actual world being a part of the possible world (from the propositional point of view) any correct judgments about logical relations in the possible world would ultimately rest on evidence taken from the actual world.

Indeed, if we would be strictly honest in talking about the world of possibility, how do we know but that the possible *a* which is the possible *b* (the possible *b* being the possible *c*) is not anything but the possible *c*. In any case, if the rules for making possibility judgments are construed as different from the rules for making actuality judgments, how will we ever know the right rules from the wrong

rules, or a correct judgment from an incorrect one when we are dealing with that infinity of alternatives, the possible world.

So precise is Professor Keyser's treatment of what is explicit in the book that one feels in the course of such criticism as I have suggested that he would have left no room for doubt had he seen fit to extend the scope of his volume to include, however briefly, some consideration of these underlying issues.[1]

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Storia della Filosofia Italiana dal Genovesi al Galluppi. GIOVANNI GENTILE. 2d ed. Milan: Fratelli Treves. 1930. 2 vols. xv + 272 pp.; 260 pp.

The group of philosophers treated in these two volumes are neither well known nor very influential out of their own country. Sig. Gentile has preferred to clarify a small period in the history of Italian philosophy rather than to sketch an epoch of greater proportions. As a consequence his book, though of importance for an understanding of early nineteenth-century thought in the Kingdom of Naples, has no decided bearing on the future development of European philosophies as a whole.

The group of thinkers includes Genovesi (1712–1769), Delfico (1744–1835 or 1836), Lauberg (1752 or 1753–1834), Borrelli (1782–1849), Bozzelli (1786–1864), and Galluppi 1770–1846), terminating in a coda on a practically forgotten figure, Ottavio Colecchi (1773–1847), who was the great opponent of Galluppi and apparently the master of the new "Hegelian" Italian school.[1] As a whole these men occupy in Italian thought—at least in that of Naples—the same transitional position as that of the Idéologues in France.

One of the most noticeable characteristics of this period is the way in which its development parallels that of French thought. As Ideology may be said to develop from Condillac—although the name was invented, I believe, by Destutt de Tracy—who in turn was

[1] The issues mentioned were discussed orally with Professor Keyser, who maintained (if I may set this down from memory):

1. That a moral proposition is always a product of experience and is therefore categorical.

2. That the basic principles of logic (such as the law of identity) are necessary to the having of what we call experience—not "products" of experience.

3. If our life were not made up of such experience, our logic would not sanction such principles.

[1] An appendix contains some unpublished writings of Colecchi, about the authorship of which there is, however, some discussion. See Vol. II, 171, n.l. Hereafter the book reviewed will be referred to in parentheses by volume and page without title.

more or less inspired by Locke, so this group of philosophers finds in Locke's problem of the origin of human ideas and the certainty and extent of true knowledge its central problem. And just as in France the problem of finding some sanction for believing in the mind's "activity" became dominant after the close of the eighteenth century, so in Italy it was not long before philosophers became dissatisfied with a mind that was at the mercy of mechanical motions and sensory stimulations and sought some way of freeing it and investing it with spontaneity. The seeds of the revolt in France were in Destutt de Tracy himself—in the theory of "resistance," which grew into Maine de Biran's theory of "effort." In Italy we find the same seeds in Borrelli, a pupil and friend of Delfico, who (somewhat inconsistently) insists upon the radical difference between sensation and judgment and the "activity" of the judging mind (I, 205).[2]

This prerogative of the mind takes on more importance in Bozzelli, who was more interested in ethics than his contemporary. In spite of his friendship for Destutt de Tracy and the praise he received from him, he insists upon the "soul's" activity, which decomposes its affections and sensations and recomposes them (I, 249). This *forza intrinseca dell' anima* is not equally strong in all individuals and at all ages—there is an echo of Cabanis here—and hence the acts of all mortals are not alike. But we are all always active and not entirely passive. In Galluppi this need of "activity" becomes so strong that in spite of his repugnance for Kant (II, 58)—whom he seems to have known from the expositions of Villers, Kinker, and Degérando—he develops an epistemology which Sig. Gentile is willing to call pure Kantianism (II, 65).[3] In Colecchi the active subject is a *punto indivisibile* (II, 172) which impresses its "notions" of space and time upon experience, which contains within itself the source of the ideas of "substance" and of "cause," which in turn "serve as a basis for all knowledge which comes from experience" (II, 178). One can easily see with Sig. Gentile how Colecchi serves as a link between the Hegelianism of De Sanctis and Spaventa and the main Neopolitan tradition (II, 216).

The historian of philosophy who thinks wholely in terms of logic will not ask himself why both the thinkers of France and Italy were dissatisfied with the mind's "passivity." If the premises of sensationalism were true, and the reasoning valid, then the conclusions

[2] Cf., I, 227. "Il pensiero, secondo il Borrelli, è pura attività, all' esplicazione della quale gli stimoli sono semplice occasione." The word "*occasione*" saved the day in his opinion.

[3] He seems to have known Kant well enough, however, to have seen the resemblance between the Kantian and the Rousseauistic argument for the subjectivity of relations. See II, 49, n.1. Cf. Miss Gertrude Bussey's "Anticipations of Kant's Refutation of Sensationalism," *Phil. Rev.* (1922), Vol. XXXI.

of sensationalism ought to have been acceptable to all who understood it. But the historian who is not shocked at finding social and political (in general non-logical) determinants of the re-orientation of thought, will not be surprised that logic had little influence on the course of philosophy at this time. The reason why sensationalism was acceptable to the French revolutionists was not logical but "ethical"; it gave them a means of combatting the philosophy of the Church and the Monarchy, for it seemed to prove that any man properly educated was as good a judge of true and false, right and wrong, as any other, and that "authority" was unnecessary in life. The reason why this philosophy seemed "deplorable," "the root of the country's misery," to Victor Cousin, a generation or so later, was that it spread scepticism and materialism and destroyed the foundations of true liberty.[4] As the Abbé Bautain remarked in 1839, "The man of to-day with moral needs more profound, conscience more enlightened, ideas more vast, views which tend towards the universal, sublime presentiments, burning anxiety—the man of to-day is no longer [Condillac's] man nor his statue. He no longer recognizes himself in a sensation-machine, in an ideological mannikin, or in a mass organized to feel."[5]

Very much the same feeling existed in Italy. The Kingdom of Naples after the French conquest of Italy became a sort of vassal of the French crown. The Bonapartist (and Muratian) régime gave its government the same pseudo-liberal air that the revolutionary government of France enjoyed. After Waterloo and the fall of Murat, a more "respectable" philosophy was needed. Hobbes had shown that one could be a materialist—of a sort—and a royalist, even a legitimist. But to the eighteenth-century mind materialism connoted revolution and as men drew away from revolution they drew away from materialism. Delfico—whom Sig. Gentile calls the link between Genovesi and Borrelli (I, 49)—a good eighteenth-century liberal, anti-clerical and "Philosopher," demands nothing better than the "physical basis" for both ideas and language (I, 46), whence there is to be expected the attainment of "natural perfectibility" (I, 53), giving rise to a universal legislation for all mankind (I, 57).[6] Sensationalism gave Delfico all the sanction he needed for his practical ideas and naturally enough he fails to see the difficulties of his basic philosophy. So true is this that while praising Kant for seeing the importance of the problem of educa-

[4] See Cousin's *Premiers Essais*, 3d ed., 1855, p. ix. Cf. his *La Philosophie sensualiste*, pref. to 3d ed., dated 1855, p. ii. I have tried to clarify all this for France in *French Philosophies of the Romantic Period*.

[5] *Philosophie-Psychologie Expérimentale*, Strasbourg and Paris, 1839, I, xxi.

[6] This was anticipated in Italy, according to Sig. Gentile (I, 59), by Filangieri. It puts Delfico *culturally* earlier than Montesquieu.

tion, he himself reiterates the sensationalistic dogmas as the premise from which the answer to that problem must be deduced (I, 109).

The plea for activity begins to make itself felt in Borrelli, as we have said above. He is a disciple of Cabanis and an opponent of Descartes, Leibnitz, and Kant, apostles of *una filosofia ipotetica o aprioristica* (I, 151). But in his desire to be more thoroughly a *philosophe,* he tries to make a union of ideology and zoology,[7] and finds a way to do it in the theories of Erasmus Darwin (I, 146, 169) and Brown (I, 181). But such theories make a physiological force essential to the human (and infra-human) animal and Borrelli was able thereby to make an agreeable simplification and at the same time to make the mind active. Nor, thought he (I, 224), did he do damage to certain great religious dogmas, for he believed that the activity inherent in the mind provided for all the freedom of choice that morals demanded.

In Bozzelli this activity assumes a major rôle, for Bozzelli believes that man's behavior always envisages a future, not a present end. He argues at great length to that purpose in his *Discorso sull' indole del piacere e del dolore* (I, 243) and consequently has to prove that the mind is able to anticipate conditions not yet present. If that be so, it is obvious that sensation must be more than a reaction to an object immediately present.

> Il senso non è semplice recettività: ei non ha niente di simile a un corpo fisico in riposo che riceva un urto meccanico da un corpo in movimento. L'anima, nell' atto che riceve quel dato stimolo, rispondo all' impressione esterna, facendo nascere la sensazione, cioè "un fenomeno *sui generis,* che si riferisce all' oggetto esterno, senza pero rassomigliargli e senz' aver nulla di commune con esso" [I 245].

But again no one can assert that this was posited because of a *logical* flaw in Condillac. On the contrary, a reading of Sig. Gentile's chapter on Bozzelli shows very clearly that, as in so many other cases in the history of philosophy—Bozzelli made an epistemology to fit an ethics.[8]

We have not the space to pursue this inquiry to further length, but I believe it would yield the same results for Galluppi and Colecchi as for their predecessors. Nor is this surprising. Practically all of these men, like their French confrères, took a busy part in the social and political life of their nation. They were men who had to have a philosophy to articulate their lives. Delfico was a famous liberal (I, 129); Lauberg *fu detto il primo cospiratore del moderno risorgimento italiano e l'anima di tutto il movimento rivo-*

[7] *Cf.* Destutt de Tracy's *Elémens d'Idéologie,* An XIII—1804, p. xiii.

[8] We have an interesting analogue of this in French philosophy in Maine de Biran, who as early as 1794, wrote that he would like to see how far the soul is active, since to be moral necessitated activity. See *Maine de Biran, Sa vie et ses pensées,* pub. by Ernest Naville, 1857, pp. 123, 124.

luzionario napoletano (I, 120); Borrelli, a famous lawyer, poet, musician, and physician, was imprisoned for his liberal views and exiled (I,132–137); Bozzelli was also a political exile (I, 235), was imprisoned, and held many state offices; Galluppi was another liberal and wrote three or four political pamphlets; Colecchi was a priest and the only member of the group whose entire life was spent in teaching—though Galluppi added a professorship of philosophy to his other occupations. Yet even Colecchi was not without his political affiliations (II, 145).

Such men are seldom great system builders, nor for that matter much interested in the minute questions of philosophy for their own sake. For that reason they are usually forgotten by later generations, as, for instance, Cousin is forgotten. Yet the present reviewer feels a certain admiration for them. They illustrate that welding of abstract thought and practical action which was typical of their time and is still typical of Latin countries. They were shrewd analysers and their moral judgments, because of their daily contact with the world of affairs, have a wisdom which the ethics of our professors seem to lack entirely.

It is evident that in spite of its narrow range Sig. Gentile has written a book which is indispensable to one who would thoroughly know the history of philosophy in the nineteenth century. First published in 1903, this second edition—which forms a part of the complete works now in process of publication—is in its revised and enlarged form a standard text for its period. Not only does it illuminate the internal cultural history of Italy, but also clarifies the spread of French, English, and German ideas into the peninsular. Students of the fortunes of Kantianism and Ideology will find it of great help in their researches and students of British philosophy will find it at least in parts instructive.

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JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

THE SYMPOSIUM. Vol. I, No. 4. Belief: *I. A. Richards.* Poetry and Logic: *P. E. Wheelwright.* Jules Laforgue: *Bonamy Dobrée.* Beauty is Truth: *J. Middleton Murry.* Jazz: *C. E. Smith.* The Irrational Malady: *M. U. Schappes.* Paris Letter: *Stanislas Fumet.*

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. 55 Année, Nos. 11 et 12. Recherches sur la nature de l'acte et sur sa relation à l'expression: *R. le Savoureux.* Etudes de philosophie chinoise: Siun-Tseu, Chang Yang, Han Fei-Tseu: *J. L. Duyvendak.* La nature du monde physique, par A. S. Eddington: *A. Metz.* Le conflit du réel et du rationnel dans la psychologie du temps et de l'espace: *A. Dandieu.*

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NOTES AND NEWS

We print below the program of the General Meeting for the Reception of the Third Series of the Paul Carus Foundation Lectures held in connection with the Thirty-second Annual Meeting of the Western Division and the Seventh Annual Meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association, at the University of California, December 29–31, 1930.

The Carus Lectures will be delivered by Professor George H. Mead on the subject: "The Philosophy of the Present." Lecture I: The Present as the Locus of Reality; Lecture II: The Social Nature of the Present; Lecture III: The Implications of the Self.

MONDAY, DECEMBER 29

12:30 p.m. Luncheon.

2:00 p.m. General Session.

The Nature of Knowledge and the Knowledge of Nature
H. S. Townsend

Belief ..... *R. M. Blake*

The Reality of the Imaginary ..... *R. F. A. Hoernlé*

8:00 p.m. The First Carus Lecture.

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 30

9:30 a.m. General Session.

The Nature of Universals and Abstractions..... *D. C. Williams*

On the Nature of Causality ..... *E. T. Mitchell*

Mr. Lewis and the A priori ..... *A. E. Murphy*

12:00 Noon. Luncheon.

1:30–4:30 p.m. General Session.

Process and Reality: Some Comments on Professor Whitehead's Metaphysics ..... *W. M. Urban*

Is There a Case for Nominalism? ..... *D. W. Prall*

The Linguistic Origins of Certain Philosophical Concepts
E. H. Lewis

4:30 p.m. Second Carus Lecture.

8:00 p.m. Smoker.

Presidential Address: On the Second Copernican Revolution in Philosophy ..... *G. W. Cunningham*

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 31

8:30 a.m. Meetings of Divisional Executive Committees.

9:30 a.m. Annual Divisional Business Meetings.

10:00 a.m. General Session.
Thought and Experience ..... *Herman Hausheer*
Philosophy Functioning in Life ..... *E. D. Starbuck*

12:00 Noon. Luncheon.

2:00 p.m. General Session.
A Theory of Judgment and Geometry of Logic ..... *R. B. Winn*
Modality and Implication ..... *A. P. Uchenko*
The Synoptic Theory of Truth—The Confluence of the Diverse Theories ..... *W. Savery*

4:30 p.m. The Third Carus Lecture.

7:00 p.m. Dinner.
Presidential Address: *De Angelis* ..... *J. Loewenberg*

Requests for reservations should be sent to Professor W. R. Dennes, University of California, Berkeley, California.

The program of the Thirtieth Annual Meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association, to be held at the University of Virginia, December 28, 29 and 30, is as follows:

SUNDAY, DECEMBER 28

8:00 p.m. Smoker.

9:00 p.m. Meeting of the Executive Committee.

MONDAY, DECEMBER 29

9:30 a.m. Welcome by President Alderman.

Symposium: *Logic as a Tool of Philosophic Inquiry.*
On Behalf of Philosophical Logic ..... *Rupert C. Lodge*
On Behalf of Symbolic Logic ..... *Henry Bradford Smith*
On Behalf of Pragmatic Logic ..... *Sidney Hook*

1:15 p.m. Visit to Monticello.

3:30 p.m. Division I: *The Philosophy of Science.*
A Fundamental Difference between the Natural and Social Sciences ..... *W. Edwin Van de Walle*
A Defence of Causality ..... *William Pepperell Montague*
The Forms of Law Discoverable in a Changing World *Percy Hughes*

3:30 p.m. Division II: *Problems Inherited from Greece*
Aristotle's Definition of the Soul ..... *F. J. E. Woodbridge*
The Problem of Individuality ..... *Philip M. Kretschmann*
The Greek Genius and Race Mixture ..... *M. T. McClure*

7:30 p.m. Annual Association Dinner.
Presidential Address: On a Possible Science of Religion
Edgar A. Singer, Jr.

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 30

9:30 a.m. Annual Business Meeting.

10:00 a.m. Some Recent Contributions to Aesthetics (*Philosophy of Art* by C. J. Ducasse; *Beauty* by Helen H. Parkhurst; *Aesthetic Judgment* by D. W. Prall).

DeWitt H. Parker — *Thomas Munro*
Katherine Gilbert — *Laurence Buermeyer*

2:00 p.m. Division I: *Ethics and the Philosophy of Religion.*
The Genuineness of Transitory Values ..... *R. H. Dotterer*
Justice as a Democratic Postulate ..... *Marie C. Swabey*
The Religious Element in Dr. Dewey's Philosophy .... *H. H. Horne*
The Interpretation of Religion ..... *Fritz Marti*

2:00 p.m. Division II: *Problems of Logic.*
Induction ..... *Morris R. Cohen*
The Logic of Analogies ..... *Scott M. Buchanan*
The Distinction between Connotative and Non-Connotative Terms ..... *Reginald Jackson*
The Beginning of Epistemology ..... *Paul Weiss*

Requests for reservations should be addressed to Professor C. K. Davenport, University of Virginia, University, Va.

INDEX

NAMES OF CONTRIBUTORS ARE PRINTED IN SMALL CAPITALS

Action and Certainty.—W. E. HOCKING, 225.
Adjectival Theory of Matter, The.—F. P. HOSKYN, 655.
AKELEY, L. E.—Methodology in Physics and Psychology with Philosophic Implications, 85, 113.
Alleged Escape from the Paradox of Judgment, An.—J. LOEWENBERG, 544.
Analysis of the Experience of Time, An.—V. J. MCGILL, 533.
American Philosophical Association, Report of the Twenty-ninth Meeting of the Eastern and Western Divisions of the.—H. A. LARRABEE, 70.
Applicability of Logic to Existence, The.—JOHN DEWEY, 174.
Are Relations Effable?—J. LOEWENBERG, 309.
Aristotelian Society Proceedings, 1928–1929.—H. T. COSTELLO, 613.
ARONSON, M. J.—Le Roy's Les Origines Humaines et l'Evolution de l'Intelligence, 497.
Le Roy's La Pensée Intuitive. Vol. I: Au déla du Discours, 500.
Le Roy's Le Problème de Dieu, 502.
Art, Religion and.—W. T. BUSH, 5.
Tolstoy's Esthetic Definition of.—ISRAEL KNOX, 65.
AUBREY, EDWIN EWART.—The Place of Definition in Religious Experience, 561.

Baillie's The Interpretation of Religion.—CLIFFORD BARRETT, 249.
BARRETT, CLIFFORD.—Baillie's The Interpretation of Religion, 249.
Barthel's Die Welt als Spannung und Rhythmus.—HERMAN HAUSHER, 611.
BAYLIS, CHARLES A.—Lewis's Mind and the World-Order, 320.
Meanings and their Exemplifications, 169.
BENJAMIN, A. CORNELIUS.—Keynes' Studies and Exercises in Formal Logic, 161.
The Problem of Knowledge, 381.
BISBEE, ELEANOR.—Schiller's Logic for Use, 439.
BLAKE, RALPH M.—Boas's The Major Traditions of European Philosophy, 327.
Lossky's The World as an Organic Whole and Lossky's L'intuition, la matière et la vie, 216.
BLANSHARD, BRAND.—The Seventh International Congress of Philosophy, 589.
BOAS, GEORGE.—Gentile's Storia della Filosofia Italiana dal Genovesi al Galluppi, 715.
Boas's The Major Traditions of European Philosophy.—R. M. BLAKE, 327.
Bohme's Die Seele und das Ich im homerischen Epos.—V. MACCHIORO, 671.
BURTT, E. A.—Dampier-Whetham's A History of Science and its Relations with Philosophy and Religion, 530.
BUSH, WENDELL T.—Religion and Art, 5.

CAIRNS, DORION.—Mr. Hook's Impression of Phenomenology, 393.
California, University of, Publications in Philosophy: Studies in the Nature of Truth.—C. W. MORRIS, 210.
Carnap's Abriss der Logistik.—H. T. COSTELLO, 109.
Certainty, Action and.—W. E. HOCKING, 225.
Chicago, Seventeen Doctors of Philosophy at the University of: Essays in Philosophy.—G. R. MORROW, 218.
CLARKE, MARY E.—Salmon's The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy, 575.
Clarke's A Study in the Logic of Value.—W. K. WRIGHT, 495.
Concerning the Philosophical Consequences of the Theory of Relativity.—F. S. C. NORTHROP, 197.
Congress of Philosophy, The Seventh International.—BRAND BLANSHARD, 589.
Copeland's Natural Conduct.—E. N. HENDERSON, 48.
COSTELLO, HARRY T.—Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1928–1929, 613.

Dampier-Whetham's A History of Science and its Relations with Philosophy and Religion.—E. A. BURTT, 530.
De Anima: Psychology and Science.—RICHARD MCKEON, 673.
Deduction, The Method of, and its Limitations.—MARVIN FARBER, 505.
Definition of Yellow and of Good, The.—D. C. WILLIAMS, 515.
Dessoir's Asthetik und Allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft.—MAX SCHOEN, 457.

DEWEY, JOHN.—The Applicability of Logic to Existence, 174.
In Reply to Some Criticisms, 271.
Dewey's, John, Theory of Judgment.—JOSEPH RATNER, 253.
The Quest for Certainty.—C. I. LEWIS, 14.
Dialectic, Experience and.—F. J. E. WOODBRIDGE, 264.
Dialectical Argument against Absolute Simultaneity, The.—A. O. LOVEJOY, 617, 645.
DOTTERER, RAY H.—Dubs' Rational Induction, 694.
Dotterer's Philosophy by Way of the Sciences.—P. W. WARD, 303.
Dubs' Rational Induction.—R. H. DOTTERER, 694.
Dupont's Essai philosophique sur la théorie de la relativité.—P. P. WIENER, 582.

Economics, The Place of Values in.—G. R. GEIGER, 350.
Eddington's The Nature of the Physical World and Eddington's Science and the Unseen World.—E. B. MCGILVARY, 180.
EDEL, A.—Further on Good and its Structure, 701.
EDMAN, IRWIN.—Prall's Aesthetic Judgment, 579.
Eldridge's The New Citizenship.—P. W. WARD, 527.
Essences Sublimated.—CHARLES M. PERRY, 57.
Esthetic Definition, Tolstoy's, of Art.—ISRAEL KNOX, 65.
Ethics, Absolute, In Defense of.—A. F. LIDDELL, 429.
Existence, The Applicability of Logic to.—JOHN DEWEY, 174.
Experience and Dialectic.—F. J. E. WOODBRIDGE, 264.

FARBER, MARVIN.—The Method of Deduction and its Limitations, 505.
A Review of Recent Phenomenological Literature, 337.
Fite's The Living Mind.—W. B. MAHAN, 642.
Forms of Generalization and their Causes.—PERCY HUGHES, 281.
FRIESS, HORACE L.—The Progress of German Philosophy in the Last Hundred Years, 396.
Further on Good and its Structure.—A. EDEL, 701.

GEIGER, GEORGE RAYMOND.—The Place of Values in Economics, 350.
Geiger's Beitrage zur Phänomenologie des asthetischen Genusses.—MAX SCHOEN, 457.
Generalization, Forms of, and their Causes.—PERCY HUGHES, 281.
Gentile's Storia della Filosofia Italiana dal Genovesi al Galluppi.—GEORGE BOAS, 715.
German Philosophy, Contemporary, A Personal Impression of.—SIDNEY HOOK, 141.
The Progress of, in the Last Hundred Years.—H. L. FRIESS, 396.
GIBBS, WARREN C.—Snyder's Coleridge on Logic and Learning, 134.
Good and its Structure, Further on.—A. EDEL, 701.
GOTSHALK, D. W.—Hocking's Types of Philosophy, 614.
Joad's Matter, Life, and Value, 415.
Grebe's Die Form des Erkennens.—ERNEST NAGEL, 697.

HALL, EVERETT W.—Of What Use are Whitehead's Eternal Objects?, 29.
HARRINGTON, VERNON C.—Muirhead's The Use of Philosophy, 331.
HARRIS, MARJORIE S.—Moreau-Rendu's L'Idée de Bonté Naturelle chez J.-J. Rousseau, 444.
Hausenstein's Vom Kunstler und seiner Seele.—MAX SCHOEN, 457.
HAUSHER, HERMAN.—Barthel's Die Welt als Spannung und Rhythmus, 611.
Hazan's Realism.—H. H. PARKHURST, 44.
HENDERSON, ERNEST N.—Copeland's Natural Conduct, 48.
HOCKING, WILLIAM ERNEST.—Action and Certainty, 225.
Hocking's Types of Philosophy.—D. W. GOTSHALK, 614.
HOOK, SIDNEY.—In Defence of an Impression, 635.
Husserl's Phenomenological Idealism, 365.
A Personal Impression of Contemporary German Philosophy, 141.
HOSKYN, F. P.—The Adjectival Theory of Matter, 655.
The Relativity of Inertial Mass, 572.
How "Propositions" Mean.—F. C. S. SCHILLER, 632.
HUGHES, PERCY.—Forms of Generalization and their Causes, 281.
Human Nature and Social Economy.—R. G. TUGWELL, 449, 477.
Husserl's Phenomenological Idealism.—SIDNEY HOOK, 365.

Idealism, Husserl's Phenomenological.—SIDNEY HOOK, 365.
In Defense of Absolute Ethics.—A. F. LIDDELL, 429.
In Defence of an Impression,—SIDNEY HOOK, 635.
In Reply to Some Criticisms.—JOHN DEWEY, 271.

Inertial Mass, The Relativity of.—F. P. HOSKYN, 572.

Joad's Matter, Life, and Value.—D. W. GOTSHALK, 415.
John Dewey's Theory of Judgment.—JOSEPH RATNER, 253.
Journals and New Books, 25, 49, 82, 110, 138, 167, 194, 222, 250, 279, 304, 334, 363, 392, 419, 445, 475, 504, 531, 559, 584, 615, 643, 671, 699, 719.
Judgment, An Alleged Escape from the Paradox of.—J. LOEWENBERG, 544.
John Dewey's Theory of.—JOSEPH RATNER, 253.

Kafka's and Eibl's Der Ausklang der antiken Philosophie und das Erwachen einer neuen Zeit.—H. F. MINS, JR., 79.
KALLEN, H. M.—Religious Experience and Metaphysical Speculation, 691.
KANTOR, J. R.—Murphy's An Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology, 108.
Pillsbury's The History of Psychology, 108.
Keynes' Studies and Exercises in Formal Logic.—A. C. BENJAMIN, 161.
Keyser's Pastures of Wonder.—JOHN SOMERVILLE, 708.
KNOX, ISRAEL.—Tolstoy's Esthetic Definition of Art, 65.
Knowledge, The Problem of.—A. C BENJAMIN, 381.
Kremer's La Théorie de la Connaissance chez les Néo Réalistes anglais.—H. H. PARKHURST, 44.
KRIKORIAN, Y. H.—The Meaning of Purpose, 96.
Krutch's The Modern Temper.—B. H. LEVY, 164.

LAIRD, JOHN.—Urban's The Intelligible World, 295.
Laird's The Idea of Value.—W. M. URBAN, 288.
Lalande's Les Théories de l'Induction et de l'Expérimentation.—P. P. WIENER, 668.
LANGER, SUSANNE K., Letter from, 586.
Reichenbach's Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre, 609.
Uchenko's Logic of Events, 361.
LARRABEE, HAROLD A.—Martin's French Liberal Thought in the Eighteenth Century and Mornet's French Thought in the Eighteenth Century, 533.
Mauduit's Auguste Comte et la Science Economique, 105.
Report of the Twenty-ninth Meeting of the Eastern and Western Divisions of the American Philosophical Association, 70.
Le Roy's Les Origines Humaines et l'Evolution de l'Intelligence.—M. J. ARONSON, 497.
La Pensée Intuitive. Vol. I: Au déla du Discours.—M. J. ARONSON, 500.
Le Problème de Dieu.—M. J. ARONSON, 502.
Letter from SUSANNE K. LANGER, 586.
A. P. UCHENKO, 475.
LEVY, BERYL HOWARD.—Krutch's The Modern Temper, 164.
LEWIS, C. I.—Dewey's The Quest for Certainty, 14.
Pragmatism and Current Thought, 238.
Lewis's Mind and the World-Order.—C. A. BAYLIS, 320.
LIDDELL, ANNA FORBES.—In Defense of Absolute Ethics, 429.
LILLIE, RALPH S.—Science and Life, 421.
Limitations.—A. A. MERRILL, 492.
LOEWENBERG, J.—An Alleged Escape from the Paradox of Judgment, 544.
Are Relations Effable? 309.
Logic to Existence, The Applicability of.—JOHN DEWEY, 174.
Lossky's The World as an Organic Whole and Lossky's L'intuition, la matière et la vie.—R. M. BLAKE, 216.
LOVEJOY, ARTHUR O.—The Dialectical Argument against Absolute Simultaneity, 617, 645.

MACCHIORO, V.—Bohme's Die Seele und das Ich im homerischen Epos, 669.
MAHAN, W. B.—Fite's The Living Mind, 642.
Martin's French Liberal Thought in the Eighteenth Century.—H. A. LARRABEE, 553.
Matter, The Adjectival Theory of.—F. P. HOSKYN, 655.
Mauduit's Auguste Comte et la Science Economique.—H. A. LARRABEE, 105.
MCGILL, V. J.—An Analysis of the Experience of Time, 533.
MCGILVARY, EVANDER BRADLEY.—Eddington's The Nature of the Physical World and Eddington's Science and the Unseen World, 180.
MACKAYE, JAMES.—The Theory of Relativity: For What Is It a Disguise? 127.
MCKEON, RICHARD.—De Anima: Psychology and Science, 673.
Meaning of Purpose, The.—Y. H. KRIKORIAN, 96.
Meanings and their Exemplifications.—C. A. BAYLIS, 169.
MERRILL, A. A.—Limitations, 492.
Metaphysical Speculation, Religious Experience and: A Note.—H. M. KALLEN, 691.

Method of Deduction and its Limitations, The.—MARVIN FARBER, 505.
Methodology in Physics and Psychology with Philosophic Implications.—L. E. AKELEY, 85, 113.
Meumann's System der Ästhetik.—MAX SCHOEN, 457.
MINS, HENRY F., JR.—Kafka's and Eibl's Der Ausklang der antiken Philosophie und das Erwachen einer neuen Zeit, 79.
Moreau-Rendu's L'Idée de Bonté Naturelle chez J.-J. Rousseau—M. S. HARRIS, 444.
Mornet's French Thought in the Eighteenth Century.—H. A. LARRABEE, 553.
MORRIS, CHARLES W.—University of California Publications in Philosophy: Studies in the Nature of Truth, 210.
MORROW, GLENN R.—Seventeen Doctors of Philosophy of the University of Chicago: Essays in Philosophy, 218.
Mr. Hook's Impression of Phenomenology.—DORION CAIRNS, 393.
Muirhead's The Use of Philosophy.—V. C HARRINGTON, 331.
MURPHY, GARDNER.—A Review of Current Social Psychology, 435.
Murphy's An Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology.—J. R. KANTOR, 108.
MURRAY, GILBERT.—Woodbridge's The Son of Apollo, 301.

NAGEL, ERNEST.—Grebe's Die Form des Erkennens, 697.
NORTHROP, F. S. C.—Concerning the Philosophical Consequences of the Theory of Relativity, 197.
Notes and News, 27, 52, 83, 111, 139, 168, 196, 223, 252, 280, 306, 336, 364, 392, 420, 447, 475, 504, 532, 560, 586, 616, 644, 672, 700, 721.

Of What Use are Whitehead's Eternal Objects?—E. W. HALL, 29.

PARKHURST, H. H.—Hazan's Realism, 44.
Kremer's La Théorie de la Connaisance chez les Néo-Réalistes anglais, 44.
PERRY, CHARLES M.—Essences Sublimated, 57.
Personal Impression of Contemporary German Philosophy, A.—SIDNEY HOOK, 141.
Phenomenological Idealism, Husserl's.—SIDNEY HOOK, 365.
Literature, Recent, A Review of.—MARVIN FARBER, 337.
Phenomenology, Mr. Hook's Impression of.—DORION CAIRNS, 393.
Physics and Psychology, Methodology in, with Philosophic Implications.—L. E. AKELEY, 85, 113.
Pillsbury's The History of Psychology.—J. R. KANTOR, 108.
Place of Definition in Religious Experience, The.—E. E. AUBREY, 561.
Values in Economics, The.—G. R. GEIGER, 350.
Pragmatism and Current Thought.—C. I. LEWIS, 238.
PRALL, D. W.—An Outline of Æsthetics, edited by P. N. Youtz, 277.
Prall's Aesthetic Judgment.—IRWIN EDMAN, 579.
Problem of Knowledge, The.—A. C. BENJAMIN, 381.
Progress of German Philosophy in the Last Hundred Years, The.—H. L. FRIESS, 396.
"Propositions" Mean, How.—F. C. S. SCHILLER, 632.
Psychology and Science: De Anima.—RICHARD MCKEON, 673.
Current Social, A Review of.—GARDNER MURPHY, 435.
Methodology in Physics and, with Philosophic Implications.—L. E. AKELEY, 85, 113.
Purpose, The Meaning of.—Y. H. KRIKORIAN, 96.

RATNER, JOSEPH.—John Dewey's Theory of Judgment, 253.
Reichenbach's Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre.—S. K. LANGER, 609.
Relations Effable, Are?—J. LOEWENBERG, 309.
Relativity, Concerning the Philosophical Consequences of the Theory of.—F. S. C. NORTHROP, 197.
of Inertial Mass, The.—F. P. HOSKYN, 572.
The Theory of: For What Is It a Disguise?—JAMES MACKAYE, 127.
Religion and Art.—W. T. BUSH, 5.
Religious Experience and Metaphysical Speculation: A Note.—H. M. KALLEN, 691.
The Place of Definition in.—E. E. AUBREY, 561.
Report of the Twenty-ninth Meeting of the Eastern and Western Divisions of the American Philosophical Association.—H. A. LARRABEE, 70.
Review of Current Social Psychology, A.—GARDNER MURPHY, 435.
Recent Phenomenological Literature, A.—MARVIN FARBER, 337.

SAIT, UNA BERNARD.—Smith's The Philosophical Way of Life, 391.
Salmon's The Central Problem of Da-

vid Hume's Philosophy.—M. E. CLARKE, 575.
Salzsieder's Die Auffassungen und Weiterbildungen der Schopenhauerschen Philosophie.—HARRY SLOCHOWER, 246.
SCHILLER, F. C. S.—How "Propositions" Mean, 632.
Schiller's Logic for Use.—ELEANOR BISBEE, 439.
SCHOEN, MAX.—A Review of Some Recent German Literature on the Esthetic Mind and Esthetic Attitude, 457.
Science and Life.—R. S. LILLIE, 421.
Psychology and: De Anima.—RICHARD MCKEON, 673.
SCOON, ROBERT.—Warbeke's The Searching Mind of Greece, 638.
Seventh International Congress of Philosophy, The.—BRAND BLANSHARD, 589.
Simultaneity, Absolute, The Dialectical Argument against.—A. O. LOVEJOY, 617, 645.
SLOCHOWER, HARRY.—Salzsieder's Die Auffassungen und Weiterbildungen der Schopenhauerschen Philosophie, 246.
Smith's The Philosophical Way of Life.—U. B. SAIT, 391.
Snyder's Coleridge on Logic and Learning.—W. C. GIBBS, 134.
Social Economy, Human Nature and.—R. G. TUGWELL, 449, 477.
Psychology, Current, A Review of.—GARDNER MURPHY, 435.
SOMERVILLE, JOHN.—Keyser's Pastures of Wonder, 708.
Spranger's Lebensformen.—MAX SCHOEN, 457.

Theory of Relativity, The: For What Is It a Disguise?—JAMES MACKAYE, 127.
Time, An Analysis of the Experience of.—V. J. MCGILL, 533.
Tolstoy's Esthetic Definition of Art.—ISRAEL KNOX, 65.
TUGWELL, REXFORD G.—Human Nature and Social Economy, 449, 477.

UCHENKO, A. P., Letter from, 475.
Uchenko's Logic of Events.—S. K. LANGER, 361.
URBAN, WILBUR M.—Laird's The Idea of Value, 288.
Urban's The Intelligible World.—JOHN LAIRD, 295.

Values, The Place of, in Economics.—G. R. GEIGER, 350.
Volkelt's das asthetische Bewusstsein.—MAX SCHOEN, 457.

Warbeke's The Searching Mind of Greece.—ROBERT SCOON, 638.
WARD, PAUL W.—Dotterer's by Way of the Sciences, 303.
Eldridge's The New Citizenship, 527.
Whitehead's Eternal Objects, Of What Use are?—E. W. HALL, 29.
WIENER, PHILIP PAUL.—Dupont's Essai philosophique sur la théorie de la relativité, 582.
Lalande's Les Théories de l'Induction et de l'Expérimentation, 668.
WILLIAMS, DONALD CARY.—The Definition of Yellow and of Good, 515.
WOODBRIDGE, FREDERICK J. E.—Experience and Dialectic, 264.
Woodbridge's The Son of Apollo.—GILBERT MURRAY, 301.
WRIGHT, WILLIAM KELLEY.—Clarke's A Study in the Logic of Value, 495.

Youtz's An Outline of Aesthetics.—D. W. PRALL, 277.